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How Much Can Tool Calls Reveal About You? Privacy Leakage from Tool-Call Traces

/ Paper arXiv 2610.41885

Key numbers

26.25%…mainstream LLM attackers show that tool-call traces enable a 26.25% attack success rate for profile inference
17.97%compared with 17.97% from prior-based guessing
4,000a benchmark containing 1,000 synthetic user profiles and 4,000 agent trajectories across four domains

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Abstract

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Large language model (LLM)-based agents interact with external tools through protocols such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP), producing tool-call traces that may expose behavioral signals about users. In this work, we systematically study the risk of user-profile inference from MCP tool-call traces, where observers infer user attributes from protocol-valid tool interactions without access to user conversations. We introduce PrivacyTrace, a benchmark containing 1,000 synthetic user profiles and 4,000 agent trajectories across four domains, generated with real MCP tools from 25 servers. Experiments with four mainstream LLM attackers show that tool-call traces enable a 26.25% attack success rate for profile inference, compared with 17.97% from prior-based guessing. Further analysis reveals that tool arguments and returned results provide the main trace-grounded evidence, while linking traces across sessions further amplifies profiling risk. These findings demonstrate that MCP tool-call traces can act as effective behavioral side channels for user profiling, motivating the development of privacy-aware mechanisms for agent-tool interactions. Code and data are available at https://github.com/AI45Lab/PrivacyTrace.

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